FEEDBACK ON MGF FOR AGENTIC AI

Enforceable authority boundaries for consequential agent actions

A proposed assurance vocabulary and runtime implementation pattern for the IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI v1.5.

DOCUMENT

Technical feedback

CONTRIBUTOR

Fidacy, operated by ZEEPCODE GROUP LLC
Lucas de Lima, Founder

FRAMEWORK

IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI
Version 1.5 · 20 May 2026 · updated 5 June 2026

01 · EXECUTIVE SUBMISSION

The framework identifies the right control. Assurance needs to distinguish how strongly it is implemented.

The IMDA Framework correctly distinguishes an agent's action-space from its autonomy and recommends deterministic, system-level controls for higher-risk actions. It also warns that prompt-layer safeguards may be bypassed or forgotten. Fidacy proposes one refinement for future implementation guidance: separate policy declaration, decision recording, boundary enforcement and downstream effect reconciliation as four distinct evidence levels.

Without this distinction, a prompt instruction, a monitoring dashboard and a fail-closed executor may all be described as a guardrail despite providing materially different protection. The proposed vocabulary lets deploying organisations, auditors and assurance providers state exactly what a control proves and where the evidence stops.

PRIMARY RECOMMENDATION	Add an evidence-strength distinction to implementation guidance under sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3. A control should state whether it merely declares policy, records a decision, technically gates execution, or also reconciles the downstream effect.

Why this matters

- An unauthorised action can occur even when a prompt says it is prohibited.
- A signed decision proves issuance and integrity, but does not prove the executor obeyed it.
- Grant redemption proves a connected executor enforced a gate before continuing, but not that a third-party system completed the effect.
- A complete operational claim therefore requires both authority evidence and the downstream system's receipt.

02 · PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION PATTERN

Authority is an external prerequisite, not a model instruction.

The pattern applies to agents that can initiate payments, refunds, data changes, exports, messages, deletions or other consequential actions. An accountable organisation issues a bounded mandate. Fidacy evaluates the exact proposed action before execution. Only an in-scope request receives a short-lived, single-use signed grant. A connected executor must redeem that grant immediately before continuing to the side-effect path.



Safety property

A consequential action cannot proceed through a Fidacy-connected executor unless the exact request is covered by active organisational authority and a valid, unredeemed grant bound to that request has been redeemed immediately before the side effect.

Mandate semantics

- Named subject, allowed action identifiers and allowed resource identifiers.
- Explicit not-before and not-after timestamps.
- Fixed action budget and maximum delegation depth.
- A child mandate may reduce but cannot widen its parent's authority.
- Immediate revocation without deletion of historical evidence.

Request and grant binding

The decision request identifies the action and resource and includes a SHA-256 hash of locally retained context. The grant is bound to those values, its issuer, validity and tenant context. The model cannot mint, alter or extend a valid grant.

03 · MAPPING TO MGF v1.5

From governance recommendation to executable control

MGF provision	Implementation pattern	Qualification
2.1.2 · Bound risks through limits and permissions	Action and resource allowlists, bounded validity, fixed budget, constrained delegation and revocation.	The deployer remains responsible for deciding whether the original policy is adequate.
2.1.2 · Identity management and access controls	Tenant-scoped credentials, named subject, actor attribution, scoped roles and database row-level isolation.	Technical attribution is not presented as a universal legal identity credential.
2.2.2 · Significant human checkpoints	High-impact requests can be held until an accountable party issues or narrows authority.	The deployer selects approvers, thresholds and separation of duties.
2.3.1 · Deterministic system-level controls	Decision and grant verification run outside the model and prompt. Valid redemption is a precondition on the connected path.	An unconnected tool remains outside the proven boundary.
2.3.1 · Runtime controls	Expiry, revocation, mismatch, exhausted budget and replay stop release immediately before the side effect.	The executor must treat failure to establish authority as a stop condition.
2.3.2 · Test policy adherence and tool use	Tests cover exact request binding, signatures, constrained delegation, action budgets and replay. Production acceptance covers out-of-scope denial, tamper refusal, exact downstream test execution, evidence export and closed-tenant refusal.	Covered tests establish specified behaviour, not absence of all vulnerabilities.
2.3.3 · Continuous monitoring and testing	Authenticated connector signals, grant redemption, reconciliation, coverage gaps and signed reports.	Outside-boundary actions are declared NOT_OBSERVABLE rather than inferred.
2.4 · Enable end-user responsibility	Decision explanations, mandate visibility, incident evidence and coverage states support oversight.	Training, tradecraft and organisational change management remain deployer duties.

MOST RELEVANT MGF STATEMENT	MGF v1.5 section 2.3.1 recommends deterministic safeguards operating at system level, especially for higher-risk actions, instead of relying only on prompt-layer safeguards.

04 · REPRODUCIBLE CONTROL SCENARIOS

The control should be evaluated by attempted bypass, not by expected-path demonstration.

Scenario	Attempt	Required result
Action-scope mismatch	Mandate permits stripe.refund.create. Agent requests stripe.customer.delete.	Signed DENY, no grant, no release.
Resource mismatch	Action is permitted but targets a resource absent from the mandate.	Signed DENY, no grant, no release.
Widened delegation	Child mandate adds an action, resource, budget, validity or delegation depth.	invalid_delegation; child is not created.
Revoked authority	Agent requests an otherwise valid action after mandate revocation.	Signed DENY, no executable grant.
Exhausted budget	Agent requests another action after maxActions is consumed.	Signed DENY with action_budget_exhausted.
Replay	The same signed grant is redeemed a second time.	Atomic rejection with grant_replayed.
Cross-tenant read	Credential from organisation B requests organisation A's mandate identifier.	Record is not disclosed; database isolation remains active.
Stale coverage	Historical grant redemption is presented as proof of a currently connected executor.	NO_CURRENT_EVIDENCE unless a current authenticated signal exists.

Suggested minimum evidence bundle

- Machine-readable mandate and version.
- Signed decision receipt for both allow and deny outcomes.
- Grant state and atomic redemption record where execution was released.
- Downstream operational receipt where completion is claimed.
- Coverage report with retention, liveness and bypass-path disclosures.

05 · VERIFICATION AND EPISTEMIC LIMITS

Every evidence object should say what it proves and what it cannot prove.

Fidacy decision and coverage-report signatures use EdDSA with Ed25519 keys. Public keys are available through a JSON Web Key Set. Signature validity establishes that the signed payload was issued under the corresponding private key and has not changed since issuance. It does not independently establish the truth of every statement inside the payload.

Evidence objects

Object	Supports	Does not independently support
Signed decision receipt	Integrity and issuer attribution of the authority decision.	Executor compliance or downstream completion.
Redeemed grant	A connected executor accepted the bound grant before continuing its path.	That an external PSP, CRM or ERP completed the effect.
Incident Pack	Grouped authority, decision, receipt, anchor state and declared correlations.	Cryptographic event binding where the pack labels correlation as time-window based.
Control Coverage Report	Observed connectors, hard-gate history, reconciliation and known gaps for a stated period.	Visibility into actions bypassing every connected boundary.
Content hash	Integrity comparison when the original local content is available.	The nature or meaning of content that is not provided.

DISCLOSURE RULE	Do not collapse monitoring, authorization, enforcement and effect completion into one claim. Preserve the boundary between them in schemas, reports and user interfaces.

Residual responsibilities

- Risk classification, mandate design and approval policy.
- Separation of duties, user training and maintenance of tradecraft.
- Business continuity, incident response and legal compliance.
- Testing of model quality, fairness, hallucination and overall task correctness.

06 · REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL REVIEW

Proposed question for future implementation guidance

Could the four-level evidence distinction help organisations and assurance providers describe the difference between policy declaration, recorded decisions, enforced execution boundaries and reconciled external effects?

Fidacy can provide reproducible test vectors, a machine-readable assurance bundle and a live production-boundary demonstration using an isolated Enterprise technical tenant and Stripe test mode. No customer data or live funds are required.

Observed reference run

On 29 August 2026, six component tests and nine production acceptance checks passed. The run observed a signed out-of-scope DENY, refusal of a refund altered from USD 24 to USD 240 before Stripe was called, execution of the exact USD 24 refund in Stripe test mode, durable refusal of grant replay, Incident Pack export and fail-closed behaviour after tenant closure.

EVIDENCE AVAILABLE	Assurance run 30cb4734 · authority f7cc9429... · signed decision and evidence digest 487c78f8...9433831
CONTRIBUTION STATUS	This submission is technical feedback. It does not claim IMDA certification, endorsement, regulatory approval or an independent customer deployment.

Primary references

1. IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI v1.5
2. Fidacy technical implementation note
3. Fidacy Action Authority documentation
4. Fidacy Control Coverage documentation
5. Fidacy public verification keys

Contact

Lucas de Lima
Founder, Fidacy
lucas@fidacy.com
https://fidacy.com